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Abstract 
If the z-score index is widely used as a measure of the stability in conventional banks, it would be 
more reliable to find an appropriate measure of the stability for all type of banks. Knowing that 
the cooperative or Islamic banks follow different contracts forms of investments such the PLS 
system and are closer to real economic, by considering the illiquid assets, we expect that the new 
measure labelled g-score, associated to tangible economic growth, reflects multiple risks and 
allows to track the banking stability.   
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1. Introduction 
Intrinsically, the bank investment processes involve committing funds to expected profit earning 
assets, but the outcomes of short-term compared to long-term processes of investments are 
particularly affected by multiple type of risks driven by economic and financial conditions (He 
and Kondor 2016). If a good investment opportunities are expected to support bank soundness, it 
would lead to more solvency of the bank, while a bad investment may conduct to illiquidity 
problems; together lead to a situation of complete insolvency, where liabilities exceed assets. This 
state is called insolvency i.e. there is less value of assets that the bank controls with a certain 
amount of equity. Consequently, the bank can’t be able to payback its money. According to 
Demirgüç-Kant et al. (2004) the liquidity variable, considered as exogenous, constructed from 
cash and some securities, can be used to measure bank risk. As financial behavior of the banks, 
the liquidity dynamic cannot be addressed as exogenous. In fact, the illiquidity would be more 
related to bank risk issue, where the share of illiquid assets in total assets exposes bank to 
insolvency risk even if the bank assets predominate liabilities. Recently, the Basel Committee 
(2010) established two official regulatory measures of liquidity risk, namely the liquidity coverage 
ratio (LCR) for measuring short-term liquidity risk, and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) for 
determining long-term liquidity risk by considering both side of the balance sheet. A high value 
of each measure corresponds to high bank liquidity. There is a need of a quantitative analytical 
index to capture the banking stability through liquidity or illiquidity variables which affect largely 
the probability of bank default.  
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Several well-known indices measure the financial stability mostly in banking sector. Among 
these indices, Value at Risk (Holton 2003, Manganelli and Engle 2001), Stress Test (Aragonés et 
al. 2001, BIS 2000) and z-score (Altman 1983). The probabilistic version of this latter makes it 
the most widely used (Lepetit and Strobel 2015), in addition to its advantage in predicting the 
financial distress of bank and focuses on bank’s risk of insolvency. The other indices signal and 
find out if the bank may face a liquidity problem. These measures could be affected by the nature 
of the bank’s activities; for example, the z-score can’t be applied directly to cooperative banks 
(owned by their customers) or Islamic banks which use specific accounting methods and work 
with the Profit-Loss Sharing (PLS) model which can expand the bank equity. The banks with 
capital risk are increasingly willing to consider transacting their assets in counter party 
arrangements whereby the credit-risk exposure is shared with the reduction in total risk in 
comparison to the lender system (Altman, Caouette and Narayan 1998). The insolvency problem 
is more perilous than the liquidity one, as it means that the bank’s liabilities exceed the value of 
its assets. A bank may become illiquid even when it is solvent, if its assets held are illiquid assets 
(either long-term financial assets or real assets) that can only be liquidated at high cost, and 
associated with greater probability of loss. This point is well-documented by Allen and Gale 
(2004). But, the economic value of a bank’s assets can be sufficient to cover its claims. The bank 
may be forced to sell part of such assets at lower than normal values. A measure of stable 
decomposition between liquid and illiquid assets could be more important and serving to manage 
early the risk of insolvency.   
 
2. Z-score and probability of default 
The time varying z-score using banks’ accounting quarterly data, with specific distinction in the 
balance sheet of each bank, is calculated using the following definitions: 
                        𝑧𝑡:𝑞 =
𝑘𝑡:𝑞 + 𝜇𝑡
𝜎
, 𝑘𝑡:𝑞 = (
𝐸𝑡:𝑞
𝐴𝑡:𝑞
) ,   𝜇𝑡 =
?̅?𝑡
𝐴𝑡:𝑞
  ,    𝜎2 = 𝑉 (
𝑅𝑡:𝑞
𝐴𝑡:𝑞
)                      (1) 
where 𝑘 is the ratio of equity capital plus total reserves to assets (CAR); μ represents the ratio of 
average returns to assets (ROA) i.e. profitability, where average returns are calculated on base of 
four observations per year. The variable ?̅?𝑡 is the mean of returns per quarter for the year 𝑡. The 
parameter σ stands for the standard deviation of returns to assets, and measures the volatility of 
returns on assets; it is calculated over the full sample with infra-annual data. The original z-score 
(1) uses the standard deviation estimate of the return on assets, calculated over the full sample, and 
combine it with the current values of capital to assets ratio and a specific time-varying mean of 
returns on assets ratio based one the average per year of the quarterly net profit to avoid the 
seasonal volatility. In the related literature, there are many versions of z-score with yearly 
observations (as Boyd, De Nicolo and Jalal 2006, Hesse and Cihak 2007, Yeyati and Micco 2007). 
Lepetit and Strobel (2013) well-document various measure of z-score with interesting empirical 
discussion. As supported by Laeven and Levine (2009, page 262) and Houston, Chen, Ping, and 
Yue (2010), in empirical implementation the logged z-score is used to reduce the skewness of the 
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simple z-score (for more details see Strobel, 2014); but the logarithm could only smooth the 
distribution shape.         
The z-score reflects the probability of insolvency or bank liabilities (𝐿) exceed assets (𝐴). From 
the accounting equation: 𝐴 = 𝐿 + 𝐸; and hence if 𝐿 > 𝐴, then 𝐸 < 0. Assuming normality 
distribution of bank returns 𝑅, and defining insolvency as a state where losses exceed equity or 
capital i.e. −𝑅 ≥ 𝐸 ⇔ 𝑅 ≤ −𝐸 ⟹ 𝑅 𝐴⁄ ≤ − 𝐸 𝐴⁄  , we can write in term of probability that 
𝑝(−𝑅 ≥ 𝐸) ⇔ 𝑝(𝑅 ≤ −𝐸) ⟹ 𝑝(𝑅 𝐴⁄ ≤ − 𝐸 𝐴⁄ ), then the probability of default is     
𝑝 (
𝑅
𝐴
≤ −
𝐸
𝐴
) ≡ 𝑝(μ ≤ −𝑘) = ∫ N(0,1)dμ
−k
−∞
 
           𝑝 (
𝑅
𝐴
≤ −
𝐸
𝐴
) = 𝑝 (
𝑅
𝐴 − 𝜇𝑅𝐴
𝜎𝑅
𝐴
≤
− [
𝐸
𝐴 + 𝜇𝑅𝐴
]
𝜎𝑅
𝐴
) = 𝑝(𝑍 ≤ −𝑧) = Φ(−𝑧) = 1 − Φ(𝑧)         (2a) 
where Φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, corresponding to left tail-
distribution. The significant lower z-score for a bank indicates that this bank is closer to insolvency 
than another bank. The z-score measures the number of standard deviations that returns realization 
have to fall to deplete equity (Čihak 2007). The greater z-score indicates the lower likelihood of 
bank insolvency risk; meaning that the probability that liabilities exceed assets is small i.e. there 
is no asset deficiency. The index will take high value when capitalization, measured in terms of 
risk error, is large. In many applications, the argument 𝑧 appears higher than 4, which means that 
the probability of insolvency is near to zero. There are some biases in z-score that underestimate 
largely the probability of default.  
Empirically, if the stochastic returns 𝑅 are not normally distributed, we can determine another 
probabilistic version of the z-score by using one-sided Chebyshev inequality (Boyd, Graham and 
Hewitt 1993, and others). By using the Markov inequality, we can show that for any random 
variable as 𝑅 𝐴⁄  with its mean 𝜇 and variance 𝜎2 for any shape of distribution, and any positive 
number 𝑎 (which is satisfied because 𝑎 = k + μ > 0), the following one-side Chebyshev 
inequality holds. It is easy to prove this proposition: Considering b > 0, we obtain that  
𝑝 (μ −
𝑅
𝐴
≥ 𝑎) = 𝑝 (μ −
𝑅
𝐴
+ 𝑏 ≥ 𝑎 + 𝑏) ≤ 𝑝 ((μ −
𝑅
𝐴
+ 𝑏)
2
≥ (𝑎 + 𝑏)2) 
Upon applying Markov inequality on the preceding, we get that: 
𝑝 (
𝑅
𝐴
≤ μ − 𝑎) ≤
E [((μ −
𝑅
𝐴) + 𝑏)
2
]
(𝑎 + 𝑏)2
=
σ2 + b2
(𝑎 + 𝑏)2
 
By letting 𝑏 =
σ2
𝑎
 and knowing that 𝑧𝜎 = k + μ = 𝑎, we obtain the following result:   
                                𝑝 (
𝑅
𝐴
≤ μ − 𝑎) = 𝑝 (μ −
𝑅
𝐴
≥ 𝑎) ≤
σ2
σ2 + a2
=
1
1 + z2
< 1                              (3) 
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this gives the upper bound of the probability of insolvency in bank.1 This result is obtained in 
Lepetit and Strobel (2015, Proposition 1, page 216). It can be used across time as the probabilistic 
interpretation of z-score. But in practice, the use of this maximum level makes the default 
probability more pertinent for large sample. Nevertheless, as indicated by Lapteacru (2016), the 
empirical distribution of the returns 𝑅 have skewness and kurtosis statistical features. To correct 
the skewness of normal function, he utilizes Owen’s 𝑇 function  
𝑇(−𝑧, 𝜆) = (1 2𝜋⁄ ) ∫ 𝑒𝑥𝑝{−0.5𝑧2(1 + 𝑡2)} (1 + 𝑡2)𝑑𝑡⁄
𝜆
0
 
which gives a probability of independent events in terms of an integral over an area of the 
standardized bivariate normal distribution.2 Using Monte Carlo simulations, Lapteacru show for 
non-normality of the returns, that the z-score with or without logarithmic transformation provide 
inconsistent results. The skewness parameter 𝜆 allows to avoid the under-estimation of the z-score. 
However, Lapteacru (2016) considers the stable distribution allowing more flexibility in the 
moments of the empirical distribution; it generalizes the central limit theorem to random variables 
without first, or second order moments.3 The cumulative stable distribution function Φ𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 has 
no analytical expression, it is defined only for some parameter values of stability 𝛽 (from 0 to 2), 
skewness 𝜆 (between −1 and +1), positive scale 𝑐 and location 𝜇 (real number) parameters. 
Considering Φ𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 and (Φ)
−1 the inverse of the cumulative distribution; Lapteacru determines 
the 𝑥-score is from −(Φ)−1[Φ𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒(−𝑘, 𝛽, 𝜆, 𝑐, 𝜇)] where 𝑘 stands for equity-assets ratio. He 
advocates that the stable distribution, via an arbitrary choice of its sharpness parameters, better fits 
the tails of the empirical distribution of returns in comparison to skew normal distribution and 
provides too small 𝑥-score with meaningful risk measure.     
The z-score could be not appropriate to measure the risk of cooperative and Islamic banks, 
because the returns on assets depend on the nature of their activities. There is a need to construct 
an appropriate measure of risk considering the financing modes. We can focus on risks involved 
through the investment of banks in both liquid and illiquid assets. It would be particularly suitable 
for banks adopting investment strategies that prefer high risk assets given a high rate of return, or 
low risk assets even at low rate of returns, which guarantees the objectivity of the probability of 
default (Čihak and Hesse 2010). The long-term investments of banks with illiquid assets could 
lead to higher levels of economic output; in contrast, their short-term investments with liquid assets 
may conduct to speculative financing and causes economic and financial crises. The link between 
bank liquidity and economic growth is well-documented in Berger and Sedunov (2017). They find 
                                                          
1 By applying Cantelli’s inequality (which is a generalization of Chebyshev inequality), for any negative number 𝑎 
satisfying 𝑎 = k + μ < 0, 𝑝 (
𝑅
𝐴
≤ μ − 𝑎) ≥ 1 −
σ2
σ2+a2
. This case corresponds to a huge loss.      
2 The skew normal distribution family 𝑆N(μ, σ, λ) is dedicated for modeling by adding a shape parameter 𝜆 that reduces 
the skewness effect. The cumulative distribution function (𝑆Φ) of the skew normal distribution is defined as 
𝑆Φ(−𝑧, 𝜆) = Φ(𝑧) − 2𝑇(−𝑧, 𝜆), and the corrected z-score “sz-score” by removing the skewness can be determined 
from −(𝑆Φ)−1[𝑆Φ(−𝑧, 𝜆)].     
3 In probabilistic terms, a distribution is stable if a linear combination of two independent random variables (returns 
and 𝑥-score) with this distribution has the same distribution, up to location and scale parameters. 
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at aggregated per capita level a positive correlation between the output and the liquidity creation 
of banks. For many banks, there is a continuous trade-off between illiquid and liquid assets, each 
one influences the financial stability of the banks, but the contribution of illiquid assets to 
economic growth is more important for the long-run banking stability.   
Regarding the mobilization of both side of the balance-sheet i.e. assets and liabilities, the z-
score index is not also compatible with the nature of cooperative banking and Islamic banking, 
because this latter relies mainly on the PLS system combining the liabilities with the assets in the 
investment processes. The PLS, expanding the bank equity and the investment opportunities, leads 
to a common risk of the investor and bank via Shariah compliant contracts like “Mudarabah” and 
“Musharakah”; and in consequence, reduce the financial fragility of the bank. It is probable that 
the capital value and reserves do not reflect the financial strength of Islamic banks, because the 
investor shall bear a part of the risk according to Shariah-terms of the PLS contracts, and thus 
reduce fairly the risk of Islamic Banks. These banks may seek for adjustments processes in risk-
taking rates by the investors through appropriate contracts of PLS system and new methods of 
capital investment. As mentioned by Čihak and Hesse (2010), the conventional banks also seek 
for adjustment processes of interest rates on deposits and loans to avoid insolvency.  
 
  3. G-score and illiquidity level 
Wagner (2007) stated, that the liquid asset matters in banking stability. In the context of derivative 
instruments, he proved that an increase in liquidity rises retained risk and in crisis times reduces 
banking stability (Wagner 2007, Proposition 2, page 130). Also, He and Kondor (2016), by using 
stochastic dynamic model of liquidity management, show that the incentive of non-financial firms 
of the economy to shift from liquid resources to illiquid capital is stronger during booms than 
during recessions. Considering the financial firms as the banks, such shifting is inherent in their 
investment behavior.  
It is recognized from the bank balance sheet that the bank is in a financially healthy position 
when its assets are worth more than its liabilities.4 When the bank liquid assets are depleted, the 
bank will be unable to meet the demand for withdrawals. It will need cash or reserves from other 
banks or the central bank to face any withdrawals. But, if the bank cannot borrow or attract 
additional cash or reserves, it will sell-off at low prices a part of its illiquid assets i.e. loans for 
commercial banks or sharing for cooperative or Islamic banks. If the shareholder equity is less 
than the difference between book value and sell-off value, the bank becomes insolvent. The 
equation (2) describes the first case of commercial banks insolvency.  
The second case of the cooperative or Islamic banks, which work with the scheme of capital 
risk, is different. From the accounting equation, 𝐿 = (1 − 𝜃)𝐷 + 𝜃𝐷 where 𝐷 stands for deposits 
and 𝜃 is the invested share of the deposits as a contribution in the bank capital and (1 − 𝜃) is 
simply the remaining fraction of deposits as demand deposits; we have: 𝐴 = (1 − 𝜃)𝐷 + 𝐸(𝜃) 
                                                          
4 The bank assets contain liquid (as cash, central bank reserves, bonds) and illiquid (loans or financing) assets. The 
bank liabilities include costumer deposits and shareholder equity.     
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where 𝐸(𝜃) = 𝜃𝐷 + 𝐸. Hence, if 𝐿 > 𝐴, then 𝐸 < 0. Assuming normality distribution of bank 
returns 𝑅, and by the insolvency definition, we have −𝑅 ≥ 𝐸(𝜃) ≥ 𝐸 ⇔ 𝑅 ≤ −𝐸(𝜃) ≤ −𝐸 ⟹
𝑅 𝐴⁄ ≤ − 𝐸(𝜃) 𝐴 ≤ −𝐸 𝐴⁄⁄ , we can write in term of probability that 𝑝(−𝑅 ≥ 𝐸(𝜃)) ⇔
𝑝(𝑅 ≤ −𝐸(𝜃)) ⟹ 𝑝(𝑅 𝐴⁄ ≤ − 𝐸(𝜃) 𝐴⁄ ), then the probability of default is     
             𝑝 (
𝑅
𝐴
≤ −
𝐸(𝜃)
𝐴
) = 𝑝 (
𝑅
𝐴 − 𝜇𝑅𝐴
𝜎𝑅
𝐴
≤
− [
𝐸(𝜃)
𝐴 + 𝜇𝑅𝐴
]
𝜎𝑅
𝐴
) = 𝑝(𝑍 ≤ −𝑧𝜃) = Φ(−𝑧𝜃)           (2b) 
We observe that the equation (2a) is a special case of a more generalized equation (2b) when 𝜃 =
0. More importantly, we deduce 𝑧𝜃 > 𝑧 and Φ(−𝑧𝜃) < Φ(−𝑧), meaning that the probability of 
insolvency is less in banks working with capital risk as PLS system than the probability of 
insolvency in banks working with loans system.    
In the line of the contribution of this paper and in the spirit of the NSFR of Basel III 
(considering both assets and liabilities), we suggest to use, as indicators of bank risks related to 
liquidity and leverage having randomness feature, the following ratios: 𝑟1 = 𝐿𝐴 𝐴⁄  and 𝑟2 = 𝐴 𝐸⁄  
where 𝑟1 is the liquid assets (𝐿𝐴) to assets (𝐴) ratio labelled LAR, its complement ratio is the 
illiquid assets ratio 𝐼𝐴 𝐴⁄ = 1 − 𝑟1); and 𝑟2 is the ratio of assets to equity (𝐸) i.e. capital of bank 
and total reserves. To exhibit the impact of illiquid assets as long-run investments on bank stability, 
it would be more accurate to consider the following formulation (4) with stock-based g-score 
definition:   
                                                𝑔 =
𝐸(𝜃)
𝐴 + 𝜇 (
IA
𝐴 )
𝜎 (
IA
𝐴 )
=
𝑟2
−1 + (1 − 𝑟1)
𝜎(1 − 𝑟1)
                                             (4) 
and its operational definition (5)5 
            𝑔𝑡:𝑞 =
𝑘𝑡:𝑞 + 𝜇𝑡
𝜎
, 𝑘𝑡:𝑞 = (
𝐸(𝜃)𝑡:𝑞
𝐴𝑡:𝑞
) ,   𝜇𝑡 =
𝐼𝐴̅̅ ̅𝑡
𝐴𝑡:𝑞
  ,    𝜎2 = 𝑉 (
𝐼𝐴𝑡:𝑞
𝐴𝑡:𝑞
)                  (5) 
In the line of z-score measure and as an alternative, we can consider a flow-based z-score, 
defined in (6) as follows:    
            𝑧𝑡:𝑞 =
𝑘𝑡:𝑞 + 𝜇𝑡
𝜎
, 𝑘𝑡:𝑞 = (
𝐸(𝜃)𝑡:𝑞
𝐴𝑡:𝑞
) ,   𝜇𝑡 =
𝑅𝐼𝐴̅̅ ̅̅ 𝑡
𝐴𝑡:𝑞
  ,    𝜎2 = 𝑉 (
𝑅𝐼𝐴𝑡:𝑞
𝐴𝑡:𝑞
)                (6) 
where 𝜇 and 𝜎 correspond to the average and standard deviation, respectively. The advantage of 
this measure is that the liquidity source could be detected in both side of the balance sheet i.e. from 
assets and liabilities. The measure g-score is based on an indicator of bank insolvency focusing on 
bank’s risk of illiquidity. It would be more reliable to cooperative or Islamic banks which work in 
principles with the PLS system, requiring direct participation of banks to the investment processes. 
The leverage variable 𝑟2 is related mostly to debt financing, since it is influenced by the share of 
                                                          
5 By applying the skew normal distribution to obtain the corrected g-score “sg-score” by removing the skewness, 
which will be determined from −(𝑆Φ)−1[𝑆Φ(−𝑔, 𝜆)] where 𝑆Φ(−𝑔, 𝜆) = Φ(𝑔) − 2𝑇(−𝑔, 𝜆).      
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illiquid assets to total assets. In conventional banks, the increasing leverage through financing a 
part of their assets by debts, may be a sign of apprising problems such the probability of 
insolvency. The debt finance does not apply to Islamic banks, they use their own sources as equity, 
retained profits, and provisions, in addition to outside sources as the Islamic Sukuk. It is important 
to show how the leverage is affected by the illiquid assets of investments. These latter are generally 
financed by long-term financing Shariah-compliant contracts and equity, but the liquid assets are 
financed by short-term liabilities. Each financing process could be related to a financial instability 
issue of banks.      
In contrast to short-term liabilities financing liquid assets, the failure in illiquid assets 
financing long-term debts and equity would be more related to the financial bank instability issue. 
Dissimilarly to short-term highly liquid assets that can be liquidated easily by sales, the long-term 
highly illiquid assets can be liquidated only at a high cost i.e. with loss. In consequence, the share 
of bank illiquid assets in total assets is directly related to bank financial instability, and should be 
characterized explicitly in indices measuring bank stability. The g-score seems to be more 
appropriate to describe this important component of bank capitalization.  
As in the z-score, the decrease of 𝜎(𝐼𝐴 𝐴⁄ ) increases the g-score indicating less risk of 
illiquidity, whereas the increase of 𝜎(𝐼𝐴 𝐴⁄ ) decreases the g-score leading to more illiquidity risk. 
This latter can generate insolvency, and lead to financial failure of bank when liabilities exceed 
assets. The greater g-score indicates lower probability of bank insolvency risk; this index could be 
relatively stable when illiquid capitalization is large. Furthermore, the positive economic growth 
or at least the stability of the bank returns from illiquid assets can attract more deposits, hence 
increasing the current liquidity and working capital, and would prepare for more investment in 
illiquid assets.      
The ratio 𝐼𝐴 𝐴⁄  would reflect a bank’s financing risk through long-term investments. If this 
ratio has a great value since 1 2⁄ ≤ 1 − 𝑟1 < 1, the greater this ratio is, the more likely withdrawals 
by depositors will expose bank to insolvency risk. In the double inequality, the lower bound is 
obtained by assuming that at least 𝐿𝐴 = 𝐼𝐴, or in fact the bank tends to keep a small or reasonable 
fraction as liquid assets, in comparison to illiquid assets, to face any shocks of depositor withdraws 
through demand deposits. The upper bound is determined by supposing that the illiquid assets are 
predominant in the total assets. This hypothesis is more realistic since in the banking system there 
is a regulatory reserve defined by the monetary authority. Also, Wagner (2007) considers that if 
liquid asset increases, the capital requirement as stability instrument becomes a less effective. 
Lucas and McDonald (1992) model the optimal level of liquid assets and state that small banks 
hold more fraction of liquid assets than large and medium banks. Alger and Alger (1999) find that 
banks relying heavily on the deposits would face larger liquidity shocks. The insolvency risk could 
be managed by increasing the leverage of bank, which increase the credit risk of conventional bank 
or Sukuk risk of Islamic bank, and may reduce the ratio 𝐼𝐴 𝐴⁄ . Also, a low ratio 𝐸 𝐴⁄  may indicate 
that bank might encounter difficulties in obtaining financing through Sukuk selling, except if the 
bank expects to earn more from their illiquid assets. 
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4. Conclusion 
The illiquidity could be a simple symptom of bank insolvency, it is important to consider a measure 
of stability using illiquidity assets to take care about the optimal allocation between liquid and 
illiquid assets of financial firms involved directly in economic growth. Instead of measuring the 
returns on all assets, we restrict to returns on illiquid i.e. long-term assets which depend on the real 
economic growth. The suggested stock-based g-score index can reflect the long-run dynamic of 
real investments of the banks. This index could be associated to the habitual flow-based z-score 
by focusing on the returns on illiquid assets. The complementarity of the two indices could be a 
road map of the banking stability.      
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